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Abstract
Evaluations of majority party leaders come from three main sources: political scientists,
media analysts, and members of Congress. Political scientists are the theoreticians. They have
defined concepts and developed theories for evaluating leadership style, strategy, and strength.
Journalists are the watchdogs. They regularly evaluate leader performance in response to
contemporary events. Members of Congress then serve as the judges and juries. They occasionally
advise leaders on tactics and strategies, and they ultimately have the ability to sanction or reward
leaders.
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Who have been the most influential Speakers of the House or Senate 
majority leaders, and what explains their influence? Which of them was most 
effective in terms of advancing institutional, party, or policy goals? Is Nancy 
Pelosi (D-CA) a “successful” Speaker? Is Harry Reid (R-NV) an effective 
majority leader? Those questions deserve the attention of political scientists, 
media analysts, and Members of Congress:  
• Political scientists have developed theoretical expectations for 
evaluating leaders by identifying the roles they play along with the 
political and institutional conditions and personal qualities that affect their 
styles, strategies, and strength. A few political scientists have also 
evaluated the effectiveness of leaders in terms of advancing political, 
institutional, and policy goals.  
• Journalists, serving as watchdogs of ongoing developments in 
Congress, are much more likely to inquire about and evaluate leadership 
performance while leaders are in office. Yet they rely upon a broad range 
of criteria for evaluating these leaders, not all of which correspond with 
political science theories of leadership.  
• Members of Congress, finally, the judges and juries in the evaluation 
of party leaders, appear to make judgments that involve a kind of synthesis 
of the standards employed by political scientists and the news media.  
Political Science Theories of Party Leadership 
Political scientists have contributed to the evaluation of party leaders in three 
ways. First, they provide the most comprehensive descriptions of leadership roles 
and explanations of leadership goals, both of which seem to be essential starting 
points for evaluating leaders. Second, they have developed theories, including the 
conditions and personal qualities that explain how leaders perform roles, pursue 
goals, and wield influence. Third, although most political scientists have hesitated 
to evaluate leader performance or effectiveness, a few have considered how well 
leaders have advanced the representative and lawmaking functions of Congress. 
Each of these observations deserves consideration. 
Before evaluating majority party leaders, we should begin with their job 
descriptions. The Speaker of the House, the only House leadership position 
mentioned in Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution, is elected first by the 
majority party and then by the whole House of Representatives. Though formally 
recognized as the presiding officer of the House, the Speaker has always been a 
political figure (Follett 1896). Today, the Speaker plays a major role in advancing 
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the electoral and policy goals of the majority party. The Speaker is involved with 
committee appointments, controlling the legislative agenda through the House 
Rules Committee, communicating the priorities of the majority party through the 
media, raising money for the party and its candidates, maintaining party unity, 
and negotiating the terms of major legislation with Senate leaders and the 
President.  
The Speaker is assisted by the majority (floor) leader, whip, and 
conference chair, each of whom performs specific tasks for the majority party. 
The majority leader is mainly responsible for scheduling legislation and managing 
business on the House floor. The majority whip polls party members to determine 
support for major bills and persuades wayward members to support the 
leadership’s position. While Congress is in session, the majority whip holds 
weekly meetings where members offer their views on issues and strategy. The 
majority party’s conference, or caucus, chair (Republicans refer to their party as a 
“conference,” while Democrats call theirs a “caucus”) is mainly responsible for 
formulating and disseminating the party’s message. 
Although Senate party leaders carry out similar tasks, the Senate has a 
different leadership structure. Unlike the House which has always had a Speaker, 
the Senate did not develop a structure for party leadership until the end of the 19th
Century, and neither party formally elected floor leaders until 1913. Today, the 
Senate majority party elects its majority leader, whip, and conference chair. Party 
leaders in the Senate perform similar roles to their counterparts in the House: they 
organize their respective parties, negotiate the legislative schedule, and serve as 
the chief spokespersons for their parties. Yet the legislative process in the Senate 
is very different from the House, and the differences affect the actions of party 
leaders.  
The Senate has nothing comparable to a Speaker of the House or the 
institutions that allow the majority party to control the legislative process. The 
Senate has nothing comparable to the House Rules Committee and no rules that 
require amendments to be germane to the legislation before the Senate. Thus, 
where the majority party leadership in the House can virtually dictate the floor 
schedule through the Rules Committee and the discretion of the Speaker’s power 
to recognize members on the floor, the Senate operates on the basis of unanimous 
consent agreements.  
The Senate also grants rights to individual members and to the minority 
party. A single Senator can block progress by putting a hold on a bill, or by 
offering non-germane amendments to bills under consideration on the Senate 
floor. A minority of Senators can filibuster a bill or a resolution, and it takes sixty 
votes, three-fifths of the one hundred Senators, to end debate. The major role of 
the Senate majority leader is to negotiate with the minority leader to develop 
unanimous consent agreements and the daily floor schedule, and to accommodate 
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the wishes of individual senators. Consequently, unlike the Speaker of the House, 
the Senate majority leader depends more on personal skill than formal powers to 
carry out leadership tasks. The majority leader also must work on a bipartisan 
basis in order to move legislation.  
With these job descriptions in mind, the logical next step toward 
evaluation of majority party leaders in Congress would require devising metrics 
for each of these tasks. Measuring the rate of success is feasible for only some 
tasks. One could measure fundraising effectiveness and the degree of leadership 
involvement in agenda setting (Sinclair 1999) and make judgments about how 
well a leader articulates a message (Evans and 2000). But standard metrics for 
evaluating member satisfaction with committee assignments, or objective 
measures of agenda setting, floor management, and negotiating ability are much 
tougher to develop. 
 The challenge of evaluating the effectiveness of leaders is complicated by 
theories of leadership and congressional decision-making that explain the actions 
of party leaders in an institutional context. Political scientists typically analyze 
how leaders assist the House and Senate in carrying out their chief functions: 
lawmaking and representation. Lawmaking requires delegation, deliberation, 
coalition building, and decision making. Leaders try to use the lawmaking process 
to advance the majority party’s electoral and policy goals: maintaining or 
expanding majority control and passing legislation that reflects the party’s public 
philosophy or addresses concerns voiced by their constituents. Representation, 
meanwhile, requires that individual members of Congress are able to express their 
views on legislation and advance the interests of electoral constituents and groups 
through committee assignments, bills, and amendments. Leaders can help 
members attain their individual goals: reelection, advancing public policy, and 
gaining influence in Congress.  
Perhaps the clearest indicators of success or failure for the majority party 
in terms of lawmaking and representational functions are legislative output, party 
unity, and number of seats gained or lost in an election. When the majority party 
achieves these goals, one might be tempted to conclude that majority party leaders 
performed effectively. Party leaders can certainly make a difference along all 
three dimensions, but the extent to which we can identify leader effects depends 
on our theories of leadership. Theories that explain leadership in terms of political 
and institutional conditions obscure the role of the individual leader.  
Given the various factors that affect lawmaking, party unity, and electoral 
results, it is difficult to say how much success or failure can be attributed to the 
leader. Legislative output is often affected by the size of the majority, the partisan 
makeup of the other chamber, the president, public opinion, and party unity itself. 
Leaders can use various tactics to improve party unity, but the degree of party 
unity is also affected by external forces. Members who represent districts with 
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similar types of constituents tend to vote together on bills that come to the floor. 
Conversely, members from the same party who might represent a different 
constituent base (say conservative Democrats) are less inclined to vote with most 
members of their party. And election results are affected by a combination of 
national conditions or local circumstances that may be unrelated to the 
performance of party leaders.  
In their seminal publication on leadership style, Cooper and Brady (1981) 
compare the hierarchical leadership style of Speaker of the House Thomas B. 
Reed (R-ME) and Joseph G. Cannon (R-IL) with the bargaining style of Speaker 
Sam Rayburn (D-TX). They argue that leadership style is primarily a function of 
party unity among the members of the majority party. When party unity is high, 
members are more likely to encourage and tolerate centralized party leadership; 
when party unity is low, members seek to distribute power away from a central 
leadership position. Thus, Speaker Reed’s considerable powers were based on the 
high levels of agreement on policy goals among party members at the end of the 
turn of the twentieth century. He chaired a Rules Committee with only five 
members, appointed members to committees, had the power to recognize 
members from the floor, and blocked attempts by the minority party to obstruct 
legislative business. Republican members viewed a powerful Speaker as the 
means toward advancing the party’s national agenda of economic expansion 
(Peters 1997), a goal they all shared, rather than a hindrance on their ability to 
represent their particular constituencies.  
Cooper and Brady (1981) further argue that a high degree of party unity 
among members is derived from the policy preferences of the members’ voting 
constituencies. In simple terms, if voters in different congressional districts share 
similar views and elect members from the same party to represent those views, 
then elected representatives of those parties will also hold similar policy 
preferences. When individual members agree on the direction of the party, they 
are thus more willing to cede power to a central leader, who can use that power to 
advance the individual and collective goals of party members. On the other hand, 
when members of the party represent diverse constituencies and hold different 
policy preferences, they are less likely to vest power in the hands of a central 
leader, and power is decentralized among committee chairs or individual 
members. In this situation, the Speaker must be skilled at bargaining with factions 
within the party and among committee chairs who have considerable power in 
their own right. Sam Rayburn (D-TX), who served as Speaker on three different 
occasions (1941-47, 1949-52, and 1955-61), mastered this style of leadership. 
Other political scientists (Sinclair 1995 and Rohde 1991) have applied the 
theoretical premises of Cooper and Brady to the study of majority party 
leadership. 
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There are, however, limits to how much contextual theories of leadership 
can help us to evaluate majority party leaders. The theory has little to say about 
the effects leaders have on leader effectiveness. Cooper and Brady (1981, 42) 
define effectiveness as a matter of the “skill with which resources are used,” or 
“actual results or achievements,” and conclude that “there is no direct relationship 
between leadership style and effectiveness in the House.” But they do not attempt 
to assess the effectiveness of Reed and Cannon or Rayburn. A purely contextual 
theory of leadership seems to offer no basis upon which to evaluate leader 
effectiveness. If leadership style is a consequence of forces beyond the control of 
leaders, or if the institutional context constrains leaders from acting independently 
of their followers, one can hardly assign a value to the effectiveness of leaders. 
Studies that incorporate the individual qualities and discrete actions of 
leaders can specify the roles key leaders played in periods of great institutional 
change (Rohde 1991; Peters 1997; Strickler 2001; Strahan 2007) and judge when 
they have exceeded the limitations on strong leadership (Jones 1968). They can 
also evaluate their effectiveness in terms of facilitating both lawmaking and 
representation. Randall Strahan’s (2007) study of Clay, Reed, and Gingrich 
combines the effects of institutional context and individual leader qualities, 
specifically the leader’s personal goals and propensity to take risks, in order to 
explain leadership behavior. Strahan argues that all three leaders exercised 
considerable influence over the policy agenda and institutional development of 
the House of Representatives. He concludes by asking if assertive leaders are 
effective leaders: “Does Congress work better under strong, risk-taking leaders?” 
(Strahan 2007, 189)  
The answer depends on how their actions affect the balance of 
deliberative, representative, and lawmaking functions of Congress. Strahan argues 
that among the three Speakers in his study, Clay did the best job of striking that 
balance. By contrast, leaders, like Reed and Gingrich, who prized efficiency in 
order to advance legislation, may seriously compromise the deliberative and 
representative functions of Congress (see also Evans and Oleszek 1997) and 
jeopardize the party’s ability to maintain its majority (Schickler 2001).  
Richard Fenno (1997) criticizes the leadership of Speaker Newt Gingrich 
and his Republican colleagues after gaining majority control of the House in 1994 
for the first time in forty years. Fenno argues that Gingrich’s lack of experience 
led to mistakes in interpreting the election results and governing thereafter. In 
essence, Gingrich’s lack of experience caused him to overstate the importance of 
the elections as a source of power in translating the Contract with America into 
legislation. He also failed to set priorities, underestimated the power of the 
presidency, and ignored the features of the political system that strongly bias 
American politics toward incremental policy change. 
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Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein (2006) describe how the actions of 
leaders can weaken the institution of Congress. They specifically cite Majority 
Leader Bill Frist’s efforts to challenge the super-majority requirement for ending 
a filibuster of the President’s recommendations for Supreme Court justices. By 
encouraging the Senate to pursue the so-called “nuclear option,” which would 
have allowed a simple majority of the Senate to end debate on judicial nominees, 
Frist risked undermining the tradition of minority rights that had distinguished the 
Senate from the House. They also describe how Majority Leader Tom DeLay’s 
abusive employment of earmarks and his shady dealings with corrupt lobbyists 
undermined the ethical standards of the House. These are two examples, among 
many, in which leaders contributed to the rise of partisan polarization and the 
decline of accountability in Congress.  
Thus, complex forces that affect leadership and congressional decision-
making limit our ability to evaluate how leaders affect legislative output, party 
unity, and election returns. Still, not all party leaders escape accountability for 
success or failure in the murky waters of the legislative process. Some party 
leaders are more inclined to take greater risks, establish clear goals (Strahan 
2007), and thus assume responsibility for their party’s legislative record and 
electoral success. It is no wonder that both Reed and Gingrich wound up abruptly 
resigning from the House of Representatives.  
What can political scientists theories tell us, then, about the performances 
of Nancy Pelosi and Harry Reid? According to contextual theory, leaders must be 
responsive to member concerns about advancing policy goals and re-election. 
Having gained majorities in both chambers after the 2006 midterm elections, for 
the first time in 12 years, Democratic constituents would be eager for major 
policy changes. During the 2006 campaign, Democrats pledged to advance policy 
in six areas (“Six for ’06”) including college access, affordable health care, 
energy independence, jobs and wages, retirement security, and ending the war in 
Iraq. Democrats were especially interested in ending the war, and Members also 
sought ethics reform to end the “corruption of culture” in Washington (Sinclair 
2008).  
Yet Pelosi and Reid would be operating with very narrow majorities and 
would have to contend with a larger number of centrist or conservative 
Democrats, representing districts and states won by George Bush in 2004. Half of 
the forty-two freshmen Democrats elected in 2006 actually represented districts 
where George Bush won a majority of the vote in 2004, and four of the nine new 
Democratic Senators hailed from states won by Bush (Cohen and Friel 2008). The 
Blue Dog Coalition consisted of 49 fiscally conservative Democrats, including 13 
freshmen who would face stiff Republican challengers in 2008 (Friel 2008). In 
addition, Pelosi needed to deal with powerful senior committee chairs (Sinclair 
2008), Reid did not have a filibuster-proof majority, and both had to live with the 
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reality of a Republican president who could veto legislation that passed both 
chambers.  
It is not surprising that Pelosi and Reid have engaged in broad consultation 
with members and committee chairs, and it is also not surprising that they have 
had mixed success in terms of controlling the agenda and keeping the party 
unified (Sinclair 2008). Both chambers managed to pass major legislation dealing 
with lobbying reform, energy, and intelligence surveillance, but factions of the 
party have splintered off on budget issues, funding for the war in Iraq, and, most 
recently, drilling for oil. The Republican minority parties in the House and Senate 
have proven to be a nuisance. In the House, the Republicans have managed to 
thwart progress on legislation by skillfully using the motion to recommit 
legislation, and in the Senate they have filibustered major legislation forcing an 
unprecedented number of cloture votes (Sinclair 2008).  
Given the institutional and political context, it is hard to determine how 
much Pelosi and Reid are responsible for legislative record of the 110th Congress. 
Scott Frisch and Sean Kelly (2008) argue that Reid had no chance of scoring 
major legislative victories in a highly polarized Senate, but they suggest that Reid 
has been modestly successful in terms of shaping public opinion on the Iraq War 
debate. To this point, however, political scientists have yet to report findings from 
any in-depth qualitative analysis on how the personal qualities of Pelosi or Reid 
affect the lawmaking and representative functions of the House. Research by 
Cindy Rosenthal and Ron Peters (2008) on Speaker Pelosi may soon offer more 
insights into the role of personal factors in her leadership of the House. (See the 
Peters and Rosenthal article in this issue of The Forum.)  
At least along one dimension—maintaining majority control of the 
chambers—both leaders seemed to be poised to enjoy success, though positive 
results for the Democrats in 2008 are far from certain. In July, Democrats were 
expected to pick up anywhere from 5 to 7 Senate seats and 10 to 15 House seats. 
If these predictions hold, Pelosi and Reid will have more breathing room to drive 
legislation. Yet, polls taken after the Republican convention in September of 2008 
show increases in party affiliation for Republicans, increasing support for 
Republican candidates, and very low approval ratings for Congress (Saad 2008; 
Jones 2008). Thus, while Democrats are almost certain to hold their majorities in 
the House and Senate, the gains may be less than were expected before Labor 
Day. Moreover, intra-party factions will not disappear; a good number of 
members will still be responsive to the more conservative districts and states they 
represent. It will take skillful leadership to manage the policy agenda and keep the 
party unified.  
If Barack Obama is elected President, Pelosi and Reid would benefit from 
having a Democrat in the White House, though this too will change the strategic 
situation for the 2010 midterm elections. A unified Democratic government 
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would enter Washington with huge expectations for change, a large policy 
agenda, and total accountability for policy outcomes. A successful record over the 
next two to four years could pay huge dividends for the party, yet Democrats need 
only look back to 1993 and 1994 for a sober reminder of the perils of unified 
government. If, on the hand, Republican John McCain is elected, the overarching 
message may be that the public wants the two parties to work together. Pelosi and 
Reid would need to deal with the disappointment most members will have over 
losing a presidential election that seemed almost certain for the Democratic 
candidate, while at the same time satisfying moderates and conservatives who ran 
for office to address challenges with energy, the economy, health care, and 
national security.  
Media as Watchdog 
On April 7, 1995, Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich gave a televised address 
to announce the completion of the first 100 days of the historic 104th Congress. 
The House of Representatives had just fulfilled Gingrich’s promise that 
legislation dealing with all ten items contained in the Contract with America 
would be voted on by the House. At the outset of his speakership, news media 
evaluations of Gingrich’s leadership were both frequent and plentiful. News 
reporters and editorial writers across the country chimed in to offer their views on 
Gingrich’s performance. His leadership of the House was variously described as 
remarkable, compelling, convincing, audacious, and divisive, to mention just a 
few adjectives.  
Later that same year, in its last issue of 1995, Time magazine featured on 
its cover Newt Gingrich, man of the year, and Time reporters were eager to judge 
his performance. Nancy Gibbs and Karen Tumulty (1995, 54) dubbed Gingrich 
the “Master of the House.” In his feature article, “Newt’s World: How One Man 
Changed the Way Washington Sees Reality,” Lance Morrow (1995, 50) 
proclaimed: “Leaders make things possible. Exceptional leaders make them 
inevitable. Newt Gingrich belongs in the category of exceptional. All year—
ruthlessly, brilliantly, obnoxiously—he worked at hammering together 
inevitabilities…” He continued: “Gingrich has changed the center of gravity…” 
and “…transformed both the House of Representatives and the speakership into 
unprecedented instruments of personal and political power. It has been an 
amazing performance.”  
Less than three years later, Gingrich would be found again on the cover of 
Time, but fortunes by then had been totally reversed: the title mantra “Man of the 
Year” had been replaced by “The Fall of Newt.” Gibbs and Michael Duffy (1998, 
40) criticized Newt for “turning opportunity into rubble” after the Republicans 
lost five House seats in the 1998 midterm elections. Meanwhile, Newsweek 
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(1998) contemporaneously portrayed a grim-looking Gingrich on its cover, 
entitled “The Loser.” The Speaker who had invented the Contract With America, 
led the Republicans to their first House majority in forty years, and declared that 
“one of my goals is make the House co-equal with the White House” (Gettinger 
1995, 1206) resigned from office. He was widely blamed for having steered the 
party in the wrong direction by making the election campaign a referendum on the 
character of scandal-ridden president Bill Clinton. 
Thus, where political scientists looking back on the Gingrich speakership 
after he left the scene would debate whether Gingrich’s leadership could be 
explained entirely by institutional and political context plus the expectations of 
his followers (Sinclair 1999), or by some combination of context and his 
individual qualities (Strahan and Palazzolo 2004), the news media did not hesitate 
to evaluate Newt’s performance at the beginning, middle, and end of his 
speakership. While Gingrich is an exceptional case, this brief review of media 
coverage exemplifies the distinctive role of reporters and the news media in 
evaluating congressional leaders. The news media are the watchdogs of Congress, 
and their evaluation of leaders is an extension of their efforts to describe and help 
their viewers and readers understand what is happening on Capital Hill. The news 
media can hold leaders accountable to the public and offer a window into how 
those leaders are running critical lawmaking institutions. They may also provide 
fodder for interest groups and political parties looking for ways to engage their 
followers in the legislative process, in fundraising, and in election campaigns. 
In addition to offering more frequent evaluations of congressional leaders 
than political scientists, the news media emphasize different criteria. Though 
journalists often consult with political scientists and mention some of the 
institutional and political conditions that affect leaders, they are more inclined 
than political scientists to assign credit or blame for a party’s or an institution’s 
performance to the personal skills or qualities of the leader. Leaders are judged to 
be effective or not as a consequence of personal strengths and weaknesses more 
so than the situation with which they are faced. Reporters typically refer to 
caricatures of leaders based on their experiences and backgrounds. Gingrich the 
history professor was thus a transformational leader, a revolutionary. His 
successor Dennis Hastert (R-OH) was the soft spoken, burly, wrestling coach. Bill 
Frist (R-TN) was the even-tempered physician.  
Media coverage of Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) fits the 
pattern applied to other party leaders. Cindy Rosenthal and Ronald Peters (2008) 
have identified the broad and eclectic range of personal criteria used to describe 
her approach to leadership: “unfailingly gracious,” “relentless fighter,” 
“politically shrewd,” with “collaborative skills,” and “the ability to make merry 
while reaching for the jugular.” And the most prevalent frame of reference is her 
personal background; she would bring to the speakership the nurturing qualities of 
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a mother and grandmother along with the cagey political instincts she learned 
from her father, a former Member of Congress and Mayor of Baltimore.  
Intuitively, a leader’s performance relates to his/her personal background 
and particular skills, but political scientists are more inclined to specify the 
conditions that affect leaders, some of which may offer better chances of success 
and effectiveness than others. Political scientists explain the consequences of 
leadership actions with reference to the combined effects of political conditions 
and personal qualities. Without a clear concept of the individual qualities that 
matter most to leadership and a full understanding of the conditions that constrain 
or permit leaders to act, news reporters may attribute too much credit or blame to 
the discrete actions of the leader. 
Compared with political scientists, reporters are also more inclined to 
focus on how leaders affect the legislative rather than the representative aspects of 
Congress. A leader is judged successful if he or she presides over a productive 
Congress. As noted in The Economist (2007, 42), “Nancy Pelosi, the new 
Democratic Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, has an impressive 
record so far. Pelosi has pushed through a number of popular reforms in rapid 
succession. In addition, she has secured a vote of no confidence in President 
George W. Bush's new Iraq policy, allowing her party members to vent their 
anger without cutting off funding. Pelosi has achieved all of this while looking 
cool and stylish, but it remains to be seen whether she can maintain her 
performance in the months ahead when she will have to deal with much more 
difficult issues.” 
As a result of the watchdog role, the news media are also more likely to 
monitor and judge the ethical conduct of leaders. Actions taken by party leaders 
may harm the public trust as well as advance the public interest. Investigative 
journalists are the first line of inquiry into leaders who abuse power for personal 
gain or who use unethical or unlawful means to advance the interests of their 
party, constituents, contributors, or associates. Notwithstanding the work of Mann 
and Ornstein (2006), political scientists are less likely than news reporters to 
monitor and evaluate the ethical failings of party leaders. 
Finally, although public approval ratings of congressional leaders are not 
anywhere near as prevalent as approval ratings of the president, reporters refer to 
poll results to evaluate party leaders. Though such ratings provide a succinct 
measure of public perceptions of leaders, they offer minimal information to 
evaluate most party leaders. The polls are too infrequent and the vast majority of 
Americans cannot possibly know enough about Congress or the functions of 
congressional leadership to make a reasonable judgment about a leader’s 
performance. Still, data collected from polls offer a few insights about what the 
public knows about party leaders.  
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First, the public is more likely to register opinions about leaders who gain 
a lot of public exposure, either because of their public relations efforts, scandals, 
or their place in history. Second, the approval ratings of well known leaders 
generally reflect the public persona cast in the media, or the state of their party in 
Congress. Thus, Speaker Tip O’Neill, who was the first Speaker to hold press 
conferences and who emerged as the liberal Democratic counterweight to 
President Ronald Reagan’s efforts to reduce government spending, was relatively 
well known to the public. In 1981 he had a 51% favorable rating, while 23% held 
an unfavorable opinion of O’Neill. He left office in 1986 with 67% favorable 
rating, while again just 23% had an unfavorable view.  
By contrast, his successor, Jim Wright, was not well known to the public 
until a scandal forced him out of office. In July of 1998, only 23% of the public 
had an opinion of Wright (12% favorable and 11% unfavorable). Less than a year 
later, when Wright was forced to resign from office, 58% of people had an 
opinion, and 40% held an unfavorable view. Naturally, Newt Gingrich regularly 
drew opinions from over 70% of the public, and his unfavorable ratings were 
always higher than his favorables. Ironically, his highest approval rating (42%) 
was registered in October of 1998, about a month before he resigned from office. 
His successor, Dennis Hastert (R-OH), was much less well known, but his 
favorable ratings were better than his unfavorables until 2006, when several 
Republican members were enmeshed in scandals. (All poll results in this 
paragraph were reported in Cohen 2007.) 
The approval ratings for the current Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi, 
and current Majority Leader, Harry Reid (D-NV), seem to be following traditional 
patterns. Pelosi, the Minority Leader before the Democrats won the majority in 
the 2006 elections, was generally unknown to the public prior to becoming the 
Speaker, albeit more well-known than Hastert, who rose from relative obscurity 
as the Majority Whip of the Republican Party in 1998. Just over half of the public 
held opinions of Pelosi in October of 2006, and opinions were evenly divided 
between those who held favorable and unfavorable views. (Cohen 2007). By 
April of 2007, four months into her speakership, Pelosi was known by a larger 
percentage of Americans and her ratings were favorable. A CNN/Opinion 
Research Corporation Poll showed that 45% had a favorable view and 30% had 
an unfavorable view of Pelosi, while only 13% had never heard of her. Yet 
Pelosi’s favorable ratings have declined over the past year. The same polling firm 
found by August of 2008 that Pelosi’s favorable rating had dropped to 38%, while 
her unfavorable rating was 37% (see www.pollingreport.com).  
Harry Reid is less well known than Pelosi. Several polls taken in 
December of 2006 and January of 2007 indicated that 65-70% of Americans had 
never heard of him, though his favorable ratings were slightly higher than his 
unfavorables (CBS News Poll, 2007; Los Angeles Times/Bloomberg Poll, 2006). 
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By August of 2007, more people had opinions of Reid, and they were on balance 
unfavorable: 27% favored him and 43% gave him an unfavorable rating. The 
most recent poll results show that his favorable ratings (22%) continue to be much 
lower than his unfavorable ratings (41%) (Rasmussen, 2008). 
Members of Congress: Judges and Juries 
Though only a handful of political scientists or journalists have been elected to 
Congress, members of the institution seem, unconsciously, to blend elements of 
the theoretician and watchdog perspectives in evaluating leaders. Members of 
Congress have a vested interest in the success of their leaders, and since they elect 
their leaders at the outset of every Congress, they are ultimately the judges and 
juries of leadership performance. They can act as team players, supporting the 
goals of their party, but they are essentially independent actors. Like journalists, 
Members of Congress tend to see politics as a contest of personalities and often 
explain behavior in terms of personal qualities of leaders.  
In addition, Members of Congress periodically evaluate leader 
performance. After all, their careers may depend upon the success or failure of 
their party. Members may be particularly attentive to polling data on the 
performance of leaders who draw a lot of media attention or who are under 
investigation for ethical reasons. Yet the way Members evaluate their leaders are 
aptly described by political science theories of leaders. Like political scientists 
and in contrast with journalists, Members of Congress are more sensitive to the 
contextual factors that affect a leader’s ability to perform his/her job and perhaps 
even more forgiving when problems arise.  
Consequently, in-between elections, Members of Congress give advice to 
their leaders from time to time about the management of the party, the agenda, 
and the work of the House or Senate. Because they are ultimately accountable to 
members, most majority party leaders heed their counsel. Adaptation to changing 
expectations is a part of leadership in a representative body, and member 
evaluations of leader performance may cause leaders to change their ways. Steven 
Smith (1987) and Barbara Sinclair (1983) describe how Speaker Tip O’Neill (D-
MA) responded to changes in the more transparent, decentralized House of the 
late 1970s and 1980s. O’Neill adapted by including more members in decision-
making and structuring choices on House floor votes to protect and advance the 
interest of individual members. Thus members and leaders negotiate the terms of 
their relationship during the course of a given Congress, much in the way elected 
representatives negotiate their relationship with constituents in the face of 
changing conditions (Fenno 2000). 
Political scientists have been especially interested in the effects of 
leadership elections on the relationship between leaders and Members. Elections 
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for party leaders at the beginning of each Congress (every two years) give 
Members a chance to make a judgment on their leaders’ performance. Members 
elect leaders whom they can trust and whom they believe have the skills suited for 
the challenges the party faces at any given time. Scholars who apply principal-
agent theories, derived from organizational economics, argue that the election of a 
leader represents a bargain. Inherent in that bargain is that leaders must be 
responsive to the expectations of the Members because Members have the 
ultimate sanction—remove the incumbent leader and replace him/her with 
someone who is more trustworthy (Sinclair 1995).  
Yet scholars also point out that Members of Congress realize that 
removing a leader from office brings its own costs, so that they are not likely to 
act hastily (Cox and McCubbins 1993; and Rohde 1991). Members understand the 
challenges leaders are faced with, whether they be internal party divisions, an 
ossified Senate, or a President of the opposite party. Thus Members will tolerate 
disagreements between themselves and the leader and even mistakes or poor 
judgments by the leader. As Jones (1968) illustrates in his classic article on 
Speaker Joe Cannon (R-IL) and Rules Committee Chair Howard W. Smith (D-
VA), Members will send a leader plenty of signals about their concerns and 
expectations. But the leader must not have a tin ear or turn a blind eye, because 
there are limits to strong leadership in a representative body, and the majority of 
members have the final say in deciding who should serve as their leader. 
True to form, House and Senate Democrats seem to sympathize with the 
challenges Pelosi and Reid have had to address in the 110th Congress, at least after 
the first session. Congressional Democrats may have been anxious about 
Congress’s dismal approval ratings and frustrated with the progress of legislation 
blocked in the Senate, but Barbara Sinclair (2008, 92) notes: “despite their 
frustration, neither House nor Senate Democrats blame Reid and his leadership 
team. And the House leadership is solidly ensconced and well regarded by its 
members.” Sinclair attributes the general level of satisfaction to leadership efforts 
to help members get re-elected through choice committee assignments, chances to 
amend bills, and help with fundraising.  
Of course, the final election results of 2008 will be the ultimate test. If 
Republican candidates gain ground with late campaign tactics that hold Pelosi and 
Reid responsible for a “do-nothing Congress,” confidence in the two leaders may 
be somewhat diminished. Yet so long as the Democrats maintain majorities in the 
House and Senate, Pelosi and Reid should be reappointed as Speaker and majority 
leader, and their work will turn toward the business of governing. 
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Conclusion 
The perspectives of political scientists, journalists, and Members of Congress 
provide a range of possibilities for evaluating congressional leaders. The 
differences in the topics they evaluate, the criteria they use, and the approach they 
take toward evaluation reflect their professional interests. Political scientists are, 
above anything else, interested in developing theories to explain how Congress 
works, and as a subset of that mission, it is not surprising that they want to explain 
how leaders behave. Journalists serve a different purpose: informing their readers, 
viewers, and listeners, who are more interested in the daily developments and the 
individuals who shape them. Members of Congress have the greatest stake of all 
in the evaluation of their leaders. Interestingly, they seem to blend the 
perspectives of political scientists and journalists toward the distinctive goal of 
serving as judges and juries. 
As a member of the political science profession, I wonder how our 
discipline can contribute more to the evaluation of party leaders. One suggestion 
might be to devise a ranking of the most influential and effective party leaders in 
history, as presidential scholars have done with presidents. We might need to let 
down our inhibitions about making normative judgments, but the gains might be 
worthwhile. Journalists might be more inclined to make better use of our theories, 
and we might offer members and leaders a better sense of which of their 
predecessors were most successful at managing the representative and lawmaking 
functions of Congress and how they were able to do so. By making our theories 
and findings more accessible, we might do the public and the institution more 
good.  
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